



doi: <https://doi.org/10.20546/ijcrar.2024.1210.011>

The Coming Human: Monster or Humus?

Euloge Franck Akodjetin*

Analytical Philosophy and Formal Logic, Senior Lecturer (CAMES), UAC/Abomey-Calavi-Bénin

**Corresponding author*

Abstract

In a hyper-technological world, the very concept of human (humanity) is in constant evolution-revolution. But then how far can the power of man go over nature and over himself? If the Cartesian wish to see him become master and possessor of nature remains a laudable ideal, does he have the right, in the name of this power, to push the humanity in him beyond the limits of this nature? The human is the human; the rest would be a dangerous or even destructive attempt. Where the human who comes from, far from being a monster, remains the consent of man himself of his original finitude. For this awareness to be effective, it is obviously necessary at the time of the technological threat and attacks on the inalienable human dignity, to leave the logic of man in favor of that of the human. A logic embodied by living together in Africa through the African values of humanization which until then will not have been taken into account but which our times demand as an opening to human ipseity, a particular expression of the universal human being embodied today by the Ubuntu of the Bantu languages or the Beninese Gbètonyinyi.

Article Info

Received: 15 August 2024

Accepted: 29 September 2024

Available Online: 20 October 2024

Keywords

Human, augmented man, humus, Gbètonyinyi, Ubuntu.

Introduction

As part of the annual celebration of World Philosophy Day, a theme is chosen to reflect the profound aspirations of our times and societies. This year, the focus is on the question of the human being and his future, in the light of the upheavals the world is currently experiencing.

Who should the future human being be: a monster or a being drawn from the earth, i.e. from humus? It has to be said from the outset that we're at the confluence of two theories or conceptions of the human: existentialist philosophy, notably with Jean-Paul Sartre, on the one hand, and the moral philosophy of the German philosopher Jonas Hans, with his ethics of responsibility, on the other. So what do we mean by human, or more

precisely, what do we continue to call human, despite the obvious historical evolution and uncertain, even apocalyptic future we face?

Do the transformations, not to say the radical transfigurations-defigurations, undergone by the human still entitle the thinker to assert that the human "exists, stable, palpable, touchable, definable and recognizable"? Is it not already outdated and elusive? Does it really exist, or is it simply the sulphurous, fuzzy concept whose disappearance humanity regrets? How, then, are we to envisage the new human figures of the future? There are no simple answers to these questions. And even the most audacious reflection would remain limited if it didn't take a holistic perspective from the outset. In fact, this is the African vision of the human being, which is still on hold due to its compromise with the dualism inherited from

Descartes' Cogito, which has obscured its horizon. At a time of major paradigm shifts, no dimension or aspect of the human being should be overlooked. In other words, only a global, in-depth analysis, far removed from hasty, superfluous methods and above all from the usual cosmetic solutions, can lead us to real, concrete proposals. The aim is to examine these ethical, epistemological, ecological, cultural, sociological and anthropological dilemmas in order to open up a multidisciplinary and multicultural perspective that is truly beneficial to the human species.

Semantics of human, monster and humus

Human, man

The title given to this reflection is not particularly explicit or intelligible at first glance, for two reasons. The first is that these words necessarily have particular resonances for each of us, whether analysts or philosophers. The second reason is that, unfortunately, they are all too often used in many different ways! The expression perhaps tends to be so when we add to it the two vocables *monster* and *humus*. Why human? Because we talk about it all the time and everywhere in analysis discourse and in all the discourse that, in the course of analysis, in some way reinterrogates morality, ethics, psychoanalysis, philosophy and the other sciences and techniques that interpret or describe man, namely art, painting, cinematography and so on. We know that the question of the relationship between man and his environment and nature, an essential problem for philosophers and scientists, has been radically transformed by the Freudian discovery, even though Freud himself never claimed to have developed a theory of the human. But will the human being of the future be able to remain humus, i.e. a being to be shaped, or allow itself to be shaped, according to the specific values of culture and civilization?

By trying to detect what is said a lot, what is said all the time, what is no longer said at all and what is said in such a way that we no longer know what we're talking about when we speak of it, year after year, the term "human" and "man" returns to the heart of debates, at the same time as its charge and psychological weight make it pass under silence: so heavy, dense, vast, subtle and even frightening is its content. But can we do without it? What, then, is human? From the point of view of traditional grammar, this term has two forms, called grammatical nature. It can be a) a noun (substantive) or b) a qualifying adjective. Usage devotes particular

meanings to the use of each nature, so that a constellation of expressions and therefore meanings has been built around this phoneme, the understanding and extension of which is continually enriched and broadened. For example, we have "être humain", "nature humaine", "le genre humain", "le corps humain"...

A little etymology tells us that the word human comes from the Latin *humanus*, *i*; homo, *hominis*, man, etc. The word man, which comes from the same origin, is the most abundant and widespread primate species. The word man, which comes from the same origin, is the most abundant and widespread primate species, characterized by bipedalism and exceptional cognitive abilities due to a large, complex brain. This has enabled the development of advanced tools, culture and language. We must not forget, however, that the philosophical conceptualization of homo comes from Descartes' Cogito, which Michel Foucault, in *Les choses et les mots, Archéologie du savoir*, attests is a recent discovery that contrasts with the ancient concept of "Mortal".

To designate the human as Mortal, as the Ancients did, is to show that the human remains a being drawn from the earth, and thus determined from its original finitude. It is this finitude, the human state of being, that modernity sought to evacuate by inventing the Cogito: "I think, therefore I am", which makes thought a product of the human. In this desire to think of ourselves as "Master and possessor of nature", humans have become men, making the masculine the expression of every gender.

This Western hegemony of the French language had an impact on the African conception of the human being, which nevertheless distinguished the human from man, woman and child. German and English do the same. As a result, it's only by breaking away from the Cartesian Cogito that we can better grasp the meaning of the human, which every culture and every civilization has a grasp of.

Used as an adjective, therefore, and this seems very suggestive here, human designates someone or something that possesses the specific characteristics of man as a representative of his species; that is composed of men (: Human being, the human species); or that is relative to man, that is specific to him (: Human body, a task that exceeds human strength); or which concerns one of the aspects of man's individuality or activity (Human sciences, Human anatomy); or which manifests to a high degree the sensitivity and understanding proper to man as an individual in a social group.

The title of the book: Nietzsche's *Humain, trop humain* (Human, too human) is a good illustration of this, and will help us to identify the two usages. The two usages are brought together here. The first "human" is a noun, the second a qualifying adjective. Or both "human" and "human" can be considered as qualifying adjectives. Human, then, refers to man, the human being, the human person. He is the object, not only of evolution, but above all of becoming. And man, by virtue of all the cultural and historical determinisms with which he is woven and to which he contributes through his actions, and by virtue of what he makes of himself, participates in this becoming. In the traditional metaphysical definition, *man is presented from the outset as a certain being who, unlike other animals, is endowed with a faculty that gives him a certain radiance: the faculty of reasoning.* In philosophy, then, to speak of the human being, instead of the generic term "man", is to take the path that attempts to answer "the central question in all anthropology as formulated by Immanuel Kant, in the sense in which he asked it: 'What is man? *Was ist der Mensch.*'

In this spirit, the questioning focuses on the intimate nature of the human being, whether animal or divine, free or closely conditioned by its environment. The human being, in the diversity of its historical figures, capable of both the best and the worst, has fascinated Western philosophical thought from the outset. Even the title isn't particularly explicit or intelligible, perhaps when the two words monster and humus are added, although these words necessarily have particular resonances for each of us, analysts or philosophers alike, which all current thinking must have the audacity to overcome at a time when particulars are being expressed as expressions of the universal. So much so, in fact, that the monster that human beings can express, or human monstrosity, lies at the heart of every civilization.

Monster, monstrous

A masculine noun from the Latin *monstrum*, a monster is an individual whose appearance or behavior is surprisingly different from the norms of society. His or her characteristics may be physical, moral or intellectual. In the broadest sense, the monster is perceived as inspiring fear, disgust, empathy or contempt. An adjectival meaning is: a living being with a major deformity, a frighteningly ugly person, or a person who arouses horror through cruelty, perversity or some enormous vice. Figuratively speaking, a monster is a person who is cruel and unnatural, i.e. who has lost the bonds and attributes that nature naturally bestowed upon

him or her. It should not be forgotten that it was from the anthropology of Aristotle, who compared man to an animal in his "man is a reasonable animal" approach, that the monstrous side of the human was emphasized until Hobbes, who announced that "Man is a wolf to man". However, this monstrous character, in contrast to the humus in the human being, does not allow for the conceptual dualism we have seen up until now between "nature-culture" or "Reason-Passion"... It is important to take a conceptual look at the concept of humus to see how, although sensitive, it participates in the rationality of the human being, not to say that it is its foundation.

Both the word "humus" and the word "man" derive from the same root meaning "earth" or "compost". The earth-limon, the clay-globe both oily and powdery, compact and malleable, is the matrix of all living things, including man - he exhumes himself from it; it is his maternal and nourishing soil, the terrain where all the acts of his life are played out until the very end - he inhumes himself into it; it is his territory in the universe - he is its guardian. This is where he differs from all other living beings, plants and animals, who have no authority to control this planetary environment common to all, just as he differs from them in that he is the only one to know of its humic origin. This knowledge, which should teach man the wisdom of humility (another term derived from the word "humus") and keep him within the limits of his right of guardianship, most often unravels into oblivion, or even turns into rejection: human pride cannot bear the idea of such an obscure, earthy origin, which reminds him of modesty, measure and simplicity, and also of his guardianship charge, which is supposed to be a duty to guard and preserve all life on Earth. Far from caring for it, man is constantly imposing his will to power, to monopolize it and to enjoy it to the full, plundering it, raping it, devastating it shamelessly.

The Earth: the more we take advantage of it and deplete it, both above and below ground, the less we know about it. We live off the land, like fruit and vegetables grown in greenhouses on neutral, inert substrates saturated with chemical fertilizers, or animals sequestered in the concentrated buildings of intensive livestock farms - all cut off from their natural environment. The "hors-sol" of humans who forget essential humility is not only physical, it's also intellectual, emotional, sensory and spiritual: it's a general "ex-humance". Off the ground, off the flesh, outside the community of the living; this growing disassociation is a calamity first and foremost for the animal world, victim of so much cruelty at the hands of human predators. We need to start from

scratch," says Pierre Rabhi, "from awareness and above all from compassion. Man is not the superior being he thinks he is. He is only truly superior when he cultivates the all-too-rare virtue of compassion" (P. Rabhi, *La sobriété heureuse*). It is this combined approach to the sensible and the reasonable in the contemporary determination of the human that gives us a glimpse of the renewed method of philosophical anthropology, the development of which we shall see further on in contemporary African philosophical anthropology. Until now, this method has been compromised by the logic of man, from which we must finally distance ourselves in order to discover the figure of the future human.

Dangers and dehumanizing tragedies: man's pernicious influence

You don't have to go far to see that the concept of man has betrayed the human being it is supposed to embody. The anthropological crises of the last few centuries (two world wars, religious wars, etc.), crimes against humanity, the ecological crisis, the threat to human dignity posed by nuclear power, ethical and moral deviations, etc. all attest to the fact that the logic of man as "master and possessor of nature" not only no longer builds the human being, but needs to move away from it. In the age of digital technology, the situation is even more worrying.

The observation made by Jean Rostand a little over a century ago is still valid today for any attentive observer of our society. He observed that the excessive speed with which humanity was progressing would be detrimental in the long term. "Science and technology have made us gods before we deserve to be men," he lamented (1967). The scientific advances and achievements born of technoscience are staggering and appalling before our very eyes. The work of Yuval Noah Harari speaks for itself. This Jewish thinker describes the future of the world painted by Rostand in fictional style. The title of the book is highly evocative: *Homo Deus: A Brief History of the Future*, first published in Hebrew in 2015. In a way, the book is an extension of Harari's previous essay, *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humanity*, although it does not repeat the construction suggested at the end of that first essay. Harari examines the major movements in the evolution of mankind since prehistoric times and, drawing on the latest discoveries in biology, computer technology and the social sciences, asks us about the future of mankind. A third book, *21 Lessons for the 21st Century*, looks at what human beings need to cope with the current changes.

The author's project is not to speculate on the future, but to identify what the societal logics at work today could eventually produce if humans don't mobilize to put the brakes on them. "All the predictions in this book are nothing more than an attempt to address today's dilemmas, and an invitation to change the course of the future" (p. 78). He wonders what humanity's priorities will be in the third millennium. He notes that history teaches us that human aspirations are unpredictable in the long term. But it is likely that humanity's major projects in the 21st^e century will be to achieve immortality, find the key to happiness and thus elevate man to godlike status. Putting words to this possible future is essential if mankind is to influence such a scenario.

In chapter seven of his book in particular, the Humanist Revolution (humanism as the religion of the XX^e century) is divided into three main branches: liberal humanism (or liberalism), socialist humanism and evolutionary humanism. The neurosciences of the 21st^e century indicate that human decisions and free will are the result of electrochemical processes in the brain. Researchers conclude that there are no free individuals. They also established that the ego does not exist, and that the individual contains several distinct entities that often come into conflict with each other. In the 21st^e century, machines will outperform humans and radically replace them. The only jobs that will remain are those where replacing man with machine is not profitable. As we can already see at this stage, the question arises as to the future of these humans who have become useless, in the face of an elite with enhanced powers. Techno-humanism gives *Sapiens* unprecedented skills.

In chapter eleven, entitled "The religion of data", the title of this chapter refers to an emerging philosophy known as dataism, which sees the world as a stream of data. The power of data management systems and the multiplication of data acquisition sensors mean that computer systems perform better than humans. Non-conscious but highly intelligent algorithmic systems know better than you what's good for you. Data management could be the system that puts man on the sidelines. In this dynamic of new technologies, the question remains as to whether artificial intelligence poses a threat to human intelligence. The departure from human logic heralded by the Coronavirus pandemic is today the undeniable trump card that will enable us to grasp the meaning of the human, for which humanity is still waiting, and for which only consent to our original finitude would be an asset. The work of many

researchers, especially Africans, in contemporary philosophical anthropology, opens the way to this paradigm of current relevance for the succession of the human as a figure of the human to come.

The figures of the coming human: for the transfiguration of the human

We don't pay enough attention to the relationship between words. You've already understood (or know) that human, man, humus and humility have the same etymology, earth in the sense of soil. In reality, humility is quite simply recognizing that we are earthly, that is, part of the living world. To progress in humanity is undoubtedly to seek to develop a deeper understanding of the world we live in, while accepting in all humility the unique yet extremely modest place that the processes that govern the living world assign to us.

Consenting to one's original finitude

It's worth remembering that man's role in these processes is less important than that of earthworms, who know how to stir up the soil to aerate it and circulate water and gases, and break down waste to reintroduce it into the cycles needed by the flora and fauna to which we belong. Darwin, aware of their vital role, spent the rest of his life studying them. So let's remain as humble as humus, while being proud of our humanity when it enables us to understand our place and respect living things. This is already the finite vision of the human that becomes clearer, and to which every approach to this human must subscribe. After Kant and Heidegger, it is in Marion's work that we find the original expression of this ontological finiteness that is so characteristic of man, and that enables us to truly understand him as a human being:

"I'm a thinking thing, that is to say, a thing that doubts, affirms, denies, hears little, knows little, wants, doesn't want, imagines and even feels. Very well, except that it follows by omission that I am no longer supposed to love or hate; better still, that I am in such a way that I have neither to love nor to hate, at least in the first instance" (Dastur Françoise 2009, p.17-18).

In this determination of the human self, it was Heidegger who was most explicit and radical, going so far as to radically change the anthropological paradigm when he announced that: "If we want to know who we are, we must not ignore this finitude, still less deceive ourselves about it" (Heidegger, 1933, p.46). As we have to realize in order to agree, finitude is not the finite, just as limit is

not limitation. Nor is it envisaged in terms of the infinite. Finitude is simply the state of being of the human being, the undeniable elementality of man. Contrary to what ordinary mortals believe, finitude evokes life, not death. It speaks of our mortal state, from which we, as living beings, cannot escape. In contemporary phenomenology, as shown by several works in phenomenological anthropology (Levinas, Blumenberg, Henry, Ricœur, Falque, Techou, Boko), the notion of "finitude" has taken on considerable importance. Placed at the very foundation of the human being, it is not only a question of our mortal condition, but also of the fact that our faculty of knowing through the senses and understanding is narrowly limited.

What's more, when seen in the light of the fragility and vulnerability of our ephemeral and changing condition, finitude is opposed to immutability and transparency, and cannot be represented until it is perceived. Man does not live because he is finite; it is finitude that makes him alive. It's his *raison d'être*. Consequently, "if we want to become what we are, we cannot abandon this finitude or deceive ourselves about it; on the contrary, we must preserve it" (Téchou, 2018, p.5). The imperative to preserve finitude is amply justified by the evidence that "it is finitude that realizes the ontological essence of the human" (Téchou, 2018, p. 161). Not to consent to it is to fail to realize oneself as a human being, and therefore to put humanity at risk. To consent to one's finitude is to accept and even fully assume it, without any thought of being able to find a way out. To accept one's finitude is to accept oneself as we are, or to accept who we are for a true existence:

"It is a fact that of all beings, only the human being is in a position to ask the question of his being. Every being (Dasein) is a human experience, not a creature or reasonable machine. All human experience is marked by finitude. In other words, finitude is the ontological horizon of our existence. Our being-in-the-world has no true meaning except in its true becoming-finite. This becoming-finite, i.e. finitude, is the fundamental mode of our being (Gbegnon Aurelien, 2020, mémoire, unpublished, p.26).

The human who comes from Africa: A contemporary philosophical anthropological perspective

The human being is a work in progress or under construction. He is being made. This is the meaning of Jean-Paul Sartre's epitaph on the tomb of his contemporary: "Man is the future of man. This is to say

that man is becoming towards the human. The human who comes is therefore the authentic man who accepts his existential condition and decides to build himself in accordance with what constitutes his existence, even his original finitude. African thinking on the human has always been based on this holistic dynamic. As Pan-Africanism so aptly suggests, the African renaissance is not a struggle against the human, nor is it a claim to identity. It is based on self-referentiality, which is a way out of extraversion. This has been brought about by the vicissitudes of history, such as slavery and colonization, and in particular imperialism, which must above all be denounced in order to rediscover the ever-active sense of the human in the original African conception. Agossou rightly points out that we sought to understand the Negro with a view to integrating him into the national economy. But the starting point was once again distorted:

"The first studies attacked survivals, folklore, instead of starting from the man in the picture, as he is, i.e., emerging from a cultural past that has shaped him, fashioned him and made him what we see him to be: a being endowed with "unassimilable substances" common to humanity, principles lived in a particular context that is itself a network of links, a complex of institutions, considered as systems of representation or as techniques at the service of social life. This man, whether black, yellow or white, is a reality of the first order. It is he who makes and unmakes institutions or any other system, yet he cannot disintegrate himself with impunity, because the elements of which he is a living synthesis somehow escape him" (Agossou, 1971, p.121).

Indeed, slavery, colonization, racism and the various forms of crimes against humanity were all occasions for major anthropological crises that call into question the humanity of human beings. The recent health crisis was no less so. In fact, it was this crisis that led to the revelation of our "common humanity", enabling us Africans to convince ourselves, following Jacob Agossou, that "before being Africans, Asians or Europeans, we are first and foremost human beings, and there are gestures and symbols that express experiences that are neither African, Asian nor European, but human" (Jacob Agossou, 2020, t.1. p. 12).

Supporting such a vision of "common humanity" against any inferiority complex on the part of the African, Paulin Hountondji denounces the anthropological reduction in which the African has inscribed himself, independently of his own will but given historical contingencies. Criticism of ethnology, which takes precedence over

knowledge of the human essence, should intersect with criticism of ethnophilosophy to pave the way for a genuine philosophical anthropology, which Hountondji believes is necessary before any inclusion of the African in the history of the reconstitution of humanity:

"I should show that ethnophilosophy had an older history, linked to the history of anthropology in general, i.e., of the Western view of so-called primitive societies, that the invention of an African philosophy, as it occurred in the 1940s, was merely the application of an older hypothesis to a particular terrain, that this application was initially the work of European theorists involved in a European debate, and that the encounter with the negritude movement only came later" (1997, p.91).

In this way, Hountondji (1997) argues for the development of a philosophical anthropology which, while originating in the African particular, would respond to the universality of the human essence. That's why, he says again:

"On the contrary, I advocated a less reductive approach, one that would restore the richness, complexity and internal diversity of our intellectual heritage, instead of the lowest common philosophical denominator proposed by ethnologists. Over and above hasty generalizations about African thought in the singular, it was necessary to find, in our past as in the present, those who were considered or are considered to be spiritual guides, to reconstruct the great discussions, the debates of ideas between these masters of thought, between them and their disciples, between them and their opponents, the confrontation, the fertile confrontation in which a history is articulated" (2007, p.103).

Philosophical anthropology in Africa, in the midst of restructuring, is now taking off, far from any vision of identity claims, but based on the reappropriation of the cultural and linguistic heritage of Africans, according to the diversity of their ethnic groups, and able to nurture living-together, as shown by the concept of Ubuntu (Doing humanity together) enunciated by Souleymane Bachir Diagne. As we all know, man is becoming. Of course! He is not a spontaneous generation. From one end to the other, he continues to strive to be human. So the human being to come must be the one who was, who is and who will be: he will be man or he will not be. But only on one condition: to be fully human, and to accept his humus condition. Man is humus to be shaped according to the values of culture, civilization and

nature. This must be absolutely unbearable for transhumanists, who urgently want to extricate us from this humiliating materiality. For them, the human being (at least his intelligence, the only thing that counts for them) could be transferred onto "supports" other than these bodies derived from the soil. When I was young, I was described as a "pure spirit", and I was foolishly flattered by it, but now I understand viscerally how dryly disembodied I was. To avoid thinking of the human in this disembodied way from now on, Jacob Agossou wants to rethink human identity based on the African socio-cultural corpus according to the Beninese mentality. In his view:

"Man is a veritable microsome, plant, animal and spiritual, somatic and psychic, individual and social, a creature of knowledge and appetite, instinct and reason, a product of his heredity and yet capable of transcending it. Although a product of his environment, which he is capable of transcending, thanks to the dynamics of vital participation, Gbèto is not immune to the days of fog and eclipse that punctuate his vital journey. In the revolution of his most favorable star, illness, a kind of vital failure and loss, attacks him. Illness is perceived as a normal cause of natural death.... The morbid state is perceived as one in which Gbètó experiences an "ontological imbalance", a failure, a sluggish existence, in short, a vital diminution. Thus, death is a situation common to all humans. It spares no one (Akotia, Benjamin, 2010).

Consequently, the digital threat, far from constituting a challenge to the human being, presents itself as a more-than-ever-favorable asset for identifying the human being who is to come as the true human being capable of saving humanity. For, let's say it again:

"Gbètó, taken in its dialectic of participation begins its "history" before its manifestation in the "Gbème" (the world) where it realizes its "dù" (its principal word) through the self-deployment of its Sé. From birth to death, he experiences varying degrees of vital integration as a result of family and social coexistence. In the course of this existence, the totalizing unity that posits him as a being of this world (Gbème), as a conscious and powerful totality is assaulted by disease. Man triumphs over it thanks to pharmacodynamics or redemptive sacrifices. But this victory is short-lived. Sooner or later, he will have to face the universal experience of death, which represents a rupture in the very relationships that made him a whole. A rupture that is ultimately a transformation, a "mutation" in his life, for his Sé will experience a new modality of existence. He will posit the

constitutive elements of man as symbolically present for a new existence, that of his optimal participation of the Gbèdótó" (Akotia, Benjamin, 2010, reprint, T2, p. 61).

In his determination of the human essence, Agossou thus brings to the surface both the transcendental and spiritual dimensions of man, which the new human must reintegrate if he is not to once again constitute a threat to himself. It is undoubtedly this dimension that the anthropologies of modernity have sought to neglect.

Today, more than ever, and for the anthropological renewal of the century, we need to rethink the human being in terms of his spiritual being, as this is the only way to preserve humanity from threats to its dignity, or to compromise it against ethnic, cultural and civilizational particularities. It is precisely for this reason that Aurelien Gbégnon, commenting on Jacob Agossou's Gbèto et Gbèdoto thesis and with a view to making the philosophy of human rights more perceptible, states:

"The human being in question is a sacred being. He is not only body and matter. It is also thought and spirit. He is inserted into the universe of being. He is one with being, with life, and falls under their laws. Like all living beings, he experiences the instinct of self-preservation...He spontaneously convinces himself that to himself, as to every being who wears a person's face, what is indispensable to life, to its maintenance and development is due by virtue of what nature has made it, by virtue of the strength and value of the lights of reason." (2021, p. 209).

For an open conclusion: Humans between Finitude and Humanization

African philosophical anthropology is the restoration of the original conception of the human. Today, it serves as a paradigm for the conceptualization of the future human. This holistic and organic conception, whose elaboration can be found in the works of Jacob Agossou, Souleymane Bachir Diagne and Paulin Hountondji, is above all based on the phenomenological principle of "pure sensitive reason" as a methodological approach to the question of man. The contemporary return to sensibility, i.e. to what the senses are in themselves (their essence), is not only a necessity but an unveiling of authenticity: man is both body and soul, nature and culture. Hence: "To forget the body and the sensible in order to reduce the human to the soul and reason is already to forget what we are" (Souleymanne, 2022), p.13-14.

In this way, the human is not fixed and immovable, as expressed by the concept of "man" that has been used to elaborate it up to now. For Jacob Agossou and the entire contemporary phenomenological tradition, the question of human knowledge has been transmuted from "What is man?" to "Who is human? Asked directly in terms of the human essence, the anthropological question, to be a question about the human, must concern the human in its entirety. For Agossou, it is as a transcendental immanent that the human being can be grasped as such, and this in terms of his humanity. This is why, in order to rethink the future human being, the holistic vision of the African being must inspire all human endeavors. In other words, in the conception of the coming human, essence remains concomitant with existence, so as to show that no human undertaking should constitute a threat to the human in him, but rather the deployment of that inalienable dignity that makes the humanity of the human being. The human being is only human by deploying his or her being in the world, which African thought has so far remained respectful of.

References

- Adanhounme Eustache, 2006, L'utopie des inventions démocratiques. Réflexion sur la question des valeurs. L'Harmattan, Paris.
- Adanhounme Eustache, 2020, L'impenser politique d'Agossou : un double contentieux à décrypter, Philosophât, n°5, Cotonou.
- Agossou Jacob Međewàle, (1971), Gbetó et Gbedotó : L'homme et le Dieu créateur", selon les sud-dahoméens, thèse de doctorat en théologie, Paris. ICP.
- Agossou Jacob Međewàle, (2020), Gbèto-Gbèdoto, reprint, Cotonou, Philosophât
- Akotia, Benjamin, (2010) "La spécificité africaine du déficit irénique" in RUCAO 33, 2010.
- Dastur Françoise, (2009/1), "La question philosophique de la finitude", Cahiers de Gestalt-thérapie, p. 7-16. n° 23. URL: <http://www.cairn.info/revue-cahiers-de-gestalt-therapie>; accessed July 12, 2019 at 5:43 pm.
- Gbegnon Aurelien, 2020, Les droits de l'homme dans la vision du père Jacob Agossou, Philosophât, n°5, Cotonou
- Gyekye K 1997. Tradition and modernity: philosophical reflections on the African experience. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hebga Meinrad, (1998), La rationalité d'un discours africain sur les phénomènes paranormaux, L'Harmattan, Paris.
- Heidegger Martin-, (1970), Lettre sur l'humanisme, trans. Roger Munier, Paris, Aubier.
- Heidegger Martin, (1923) Ontologie, herméneutique de facticité, Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann.
- Hountondji Paulin, (1997), Combats pour le sens, Cotonou, Flamboyant.
- Souleymanne B. Diagne, (2022) From language to language. The hospitality of translation. Paris, Albin Michel.
- Techou Roland (2018), Phenomenology of the Transcendent, Essay on the Analytics of Human Finitude; Cotonou, Flamboyant.

How to cite this article:

Euloge Franck Akodjetin. 2024. The Coming Human: Monster or Humus?. *Int.J.Curr.Res.Aca.Rev.* 12(10), 101-108. doi: <https://doi.org/10.20546/ijcrar.2024.1210.011>